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Slavery can neither fully explain nor ultimatelyjustify the American Civil War.This realization isunfortunately obscured because most scholars
and buffs alike have usually sought a single cause for
those four years of soul-wrenching conflict. The early
nationalist interpretation, put forward by historian
James Ford Rhodes, blamed one factor and one factor
only: slavery. Slavery induced the southern states to
secede, and Rhodes unreflectively assumed that the
national government had no option but to suppress
them. Later revisionist
historians, such as Avery
O. Craven and James G.
Randall, contended that
slavery was dying of its
own accord and attrib-





fanatics on both sides.
The Progressive per-
spective of Charles
Beard also denied slav-
ery’s role and replaced it with economic considerations.
Then, beginning in the 1950s, a neo-abolitionist
school, which today dominates Civil War scholarship,
reaffirmed the centrality of slavery.
Yet while these competing interpretations have
waxed and waned, the underlying quest for the one
overriding cause continues unabated.What southerners
called their “peculiar institution” was indeed the funda-
mental cause of secession. That proposition no longer
admits of any doubt. Historians would be hard pressed
to find any causal claim in all human history for which
the empirical support is more overwhelming.
But when historians go on to claim that secession
made war inevitable, they embrace a common but log-
ically indefensible leap. Only a few prominent neo-
abolitionist historians, such as Eric Foner and Kenneth
Stampp, have recognized that Civil War causation
breaks down into at least two questions. Why did the
southern states want to leave the Union? And why did
the northern states
refuse to let them go?
Just because slavery is
the answer to the 
first, it does not neces-






the Civil War with an
implicit and unchal-
lenged prejudice in
favor of national unity.
Yet secession and war are distinct issues. For seces-
sion to lead to war, northerners had to be determined
to hold the Union together with violence. And schol-
arly research has demonstrated that slavery had very lit-
tle, if anything, to do with that determination, either on
B Y  J E F F R E Y  R O G E R S  H U M M E L
The Question of Slavery
26T H E  F R E E M A N :  w w w. t h e f r e e m a n o n l i n e . o r g
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel (jhummel@gguol.ggu.edu) is an associate professor
of economics at San Jose State University. He is the author of
Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men:A History of the
American Civil War.
Slavery was behind the South’s secession. It wasn’t behind the North’s violent
response, however.
the part of President Abraham Lincoln or of the north-
ern public generally.
The sole northern group that had always made
opposition to slavery their primary goal was the aboli-
tionists. They burst on the national landscape in the
1830s, demanding the immediate emancipation of all
slaves, without any compensation to slaveholders, and
full political rights for all blacks. Less well known is that
they were also often advocates of disunion. The most
prominent and vitriolic of these abolitionists, William
Lloyd Garrison, went so far as to denounce the Consti-
tution for its proslavery clauses as “a covenant with
death and an agreement with hell.” During one Fourth
of July celebration he publicly burned a copy, proclaim-
ing: “So perish all compromises with tyranny!” He
believed that, if anything, the North should secede.That
way it would get out from under the Constitution’s
fugitive-slave clause and become a
haven for runaway slaves. The slogan,
“No Union with Slave-Holders”
appeared on the masthead of Garri-
son’s weekly paper, The Liberator, for
years.
Thus passionately opposing slavery
and simultaneously favoring secession
are quite consistent. And Garrison’s
strategic vision was hardly unique to
him. Nearly all of slavery’s most radical opponents ini-
tially shared it, including Frederick Douglass, the free
black leader who in 1838 had escaped from slavery in
Maryland, and Wendell Philips, a wealthy lawyer and
Boston Brahmin. Needless to say, this disrespect for the
Union did not go over well in the free states. Aboli-
tionist lecturers, presses, and property were frequent
targets of hostile mobs throughout the 1830s. Nor did
all abolitionists support disunion. Many eventually
would turn away from Garrison to take up political
activity in a quest for respectability and success. As the
antislavery crusade split into doctrinal factions, the
resort to the ballot box would bring both a broadened
appeal and a dilution of purity.
The Republican Party eventually triumphed by
reducing political antislavery to its lowest common
denominator. The party’s main position, preventing
slavery’s extension into new territories, carried no taint
of disunion. It allowed northerners to take steps against
slavery in a distant sphere while honoring their consti-
tutional obligation to leave the local institutions of the
southern states alone. Here moreover was an antislavery
position that could be made consistent with racism.
Keeping slaves out of the territories was an excellent
way to keep blacks out altogether. Abolitionists had
failed to win over the North because they had put their
opposition to slavery ahead of the Union. Republicans
succeeded because they put the Union ahead of their
opposition to slavery.
Republicans and the Slave Power
That Republicans promised not to interfere withthe peculiar institution in the existing states—to
the point of supporting in 1861 a proposed unamendable
thirteenth amendment that would have explicitly guar-
anteed slavery—goes without saying.
Even the platform of the abolitionist
Liberty Party, which conducted pres-
idential campaigns in 1840 and 1844,
had respected this constitutional con-
straint. But there were other constitu-
tionally permissible steps that the
central government could have taken
and yet the Republican platform
eschewed, such as abolishing slavery
in the District of Columbia and prohibiting the inter-
state and coastal slave trade. Lincoln even promised in
his first inaugural to enforce the fugitive slave law, so
hated among many northerners.
The plain fact that Lincoln was not an abolitionist is
often cited by those who wish to deny that the seced-
ing states were concerned about slavery’s future. The
observation has become commonplace today that spe-
cial interests inordinately influence government policy.
This has actually always been the case; it is just less
noticeable or objectionable when government is small
and unobtrusive. One of the most powerful special
interests during the pre-Civil War period was what
abolitionists and Republicans referred to as the “Slave
Power.” Despite constituting only one-quarter of
southern families in 1860, slaveholders had dominated
American politics both in the southern states and at the
national level.
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Then in 1860 a northerner who had not carried a
single slave state, and in ten of them did not get a single
recorded vote, was elected president. Nationwide, Lin-
coln received only 40 percent of the popular vote.Yet
he won with the electoral votes of every free state
except New Jersey, where he got four out of the state’s
seven. The contest in the South—mainly between the
Southern Democratic and Constitutional Union candi-
dates—had proved utterly irrelevant. Even if the votes
of all Lincoln’s opponents had been combined, he still
would have won. Nothing could make the looming
political impotence of the slave states more stark.
Almost overnight a special interest that had dictated
policy in Congress, to the executive, on the Supreme
Court, and usually in both major parties was politically
dispossessed.
Southern fire-eaters recognized
that a major faction within the
Republican Party did favor further
steps to divorce the general govern-
ment from slavery. Lincoln appointed
to his cabinet at least two of these
radical Republicans: William Henry
Seward of New York as secretary of
state and Salmon Portland Chase of
Ohio as secretary of the treasury.
Even if the radicals did not immedi-
ately have their way, the Republican
Party now controlled federal patron-
age, the postal service, military posts, and judicial
appointments. Lincoln could put Republicans, aboli-
tionists, and even free blacks into public office all over
the South.That a national administration—for the first
time—morally condemned the peculiar institution
might in and of itself trigger slave resistance. And the
Republican commitment to a territorial policy that the
Supreme Court had already declared unconstitutional
in the infamous Dred Scott decision showed that slave-
holders could not rely on paper guarantees.
The editors of the Richmond Enquirer described how
Lincoln’s victory must in the long term destroy slavery.
“Upon the accession of Lincoln to power, we would
apprehend no direct act of violence against negro prop-
erty,” the editors conceded. But “the use of federal
office, contracts, power and patronage” would result in
“the building up in every Southern State of a Black
Republican party, the ally and stipendiary of Northern
fanaticism, to become in a few short years the open
advocate of abolition.”Already a Missouri congressman,
Frank Blair, Jr., whose family had long been powerful
within Democratic circles, had gone over to the
Republicans and delivered 10 percent of that border
slave state’s presidential vote to Lincoln.
The Enquirer also understood that the eventual “ruin
of every Southern State by the destruction of negro
labor” would be accomplished through the increase in
fugitive slaves after tampering with the peculiar institu-
tion in the upper South. “By gradual and insidious
approach, under the fostering hand of federal power,
Abolitionism will grow up in every border Southern
State, converting them into free
States, then into ‘cities of refuge’ for
runaway negroes from the gulf States.
. . . There are no consequences that
can follow, even forcible disunion,
more disastrous to the future prosper-
ity of the people of Virginia.”
Nothing to Lose
Secession was risky. But withRepublicans in control of the
national government, many southern
whites felt they had nothing to lose.
Slavery seemed eventually doomed
otherwise. Slaveholders could better depend on an
independent central authority to provide protections
against runaways by policing the new borders. As one
Georgian explained in a letter to his representative in
Congress,Alexander H. Stephens, independence would
permit southerners to erect “an impassable wall
between the North & the South so that negroes could
not pass over to the North or an abolitionist come to
the South to annoy us any more.”
Other southerners disagreed, however, including
Stephens himself. Although he would become the
Confederacy’s vice president, he opposed his state’s
secession, judging “slavery more secure in the Union
than out of it.” By leaving the Union, southerners were
abandoning the Constitution’s protections for slavery
and possibly unleashing the very plague of runaways
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they feared. Indeed, Lincoln would warn in his first
inaugural that the seceding states could no longer rely
on this national subsidy. The withdrawal of the deep
South’s representatives from Congress would make
free-state control over the national government more
pronounced than ever. The Republicans would have a
free hand in the territories, whereas the economic via-
bility of a small, independent slave republic was in
doubt, especially if it could not expand. Even without
resorting to war, Republicans could have implemented
a set of policies that would have brought the peculiar
institution to an end within an independent Confeder-
acy, certainly by the turn of the century, if Lincoln had
been purely interested in ending slav-
ery rather than preserving the Union.
As Lincoln took the oath of office,
the Union still contained eight slave
states, more than had left. Secession
had so far failed in the upper South,
where the black population was less
dense. Even in a few states of the lower
South, disunion had triumphed by
only narrow margins. Some northern-
ers were prepared to allow the new
Gulf Coast Confederacy to depart in
peace. Militant abolitionists such as
Garrison were mainly concerned that
South Carolina’s secession was just a
bluff. Even Horace Greeley’s staunchly
Republican New York Tribune had
briefly come out for letting the cotton
states go, hoping “never to live in a republic whereof
one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets.”
Lincoln’s Determination
Lincoln, on the other hand, was determined to pre-serve the Union by force if necessary. Slavery’s 
abolition did not figure at all in either his avowed justi-
fications or his private motivations. “I hold that . . . the
Union of these States is perpetual,” the President
asserted in his first inaugural address, cautiously reveal-
ing this unyielding posture. “The Union is unbroken,
and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the
Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the
laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all States.”
Lincoln’s determination received the hearty applause
of powerful northern interests. Westerners feared the
closing of the lower Mississippi River, even though the
Confederate government promised free navigation.
Eastern manufacturers worried that they would lose
southern markets to European competitors because of
the Confederacy’s free-trade policy. Yankee merchants
and shipbuilders faced an end to a monopoly on the
South’s coastal trade that the government granted to
U.S. vessels. Holders of government securities were
edgy about the Union’s loss of tariff revenue. But in the
final analysis, American nationalism proved to be the
most compelling opponent of southern independence.
Republicans had promised northern
voters that they could have both anti-
slavery and Union. Now that the
Union was imperiled, the Republican
Party had to take decisive action or
face political oblivion.
The deep South’s refusal to abide
by the outcome of a fair and legal
election struck northern voters as a
selfish betrayal of the nation’s unique
mission. “Plainly the central idea of
secession is the essence of anarchy,”
argued Lincoln. Indeed, his inaugural
equated secession with despotism. “A
majority held in restraint by constitu-
tional checks and limitations, and
always changing easily with deliberate
changes of popular opinions and sen-
timents, is the only true sovereign of a free people.
Whoever rejects it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or
despotism,” because “unanimity is impossible; the rule
of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly
inadmissible.” Worse still, the successful breakaway of
the lower South raised the possibility of other regions
separating.
Yet Lincoln also wished to preserve the loyalty of
the upper South. Southern unionists made clear their
conviction that no state should be forced to remain. He
therefore initially settled on a defensive strategy to
uphold national authority. Until the Confederate bom-
bardment of Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, the Presi-
dent could not have counted on enthusiastic northern
29 A P R I L  2 0 1 1











support for an appeal to arms. The attack, however,
electrified the free states, as Lincoln issued his procla-
mation calling up the state militias.The President’s call
garnered an opposite reaction in the slave states. It
wiped out any lingering unionism in those that had
already seceded. Still more decisive was its impact on
the wavering states of the upper South.Virginia, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas all promptly trans-
ferred their allegiance to the Confederate States of
America. At a single stroke of the pen, Lincoln had
more than doubled the Confederacy’s white population
and material resources.
Once war got underway Lincoln continued to insist
he wanted only to preserve the Union, and the newly
elected Congress confirmed this war aim shortly after it
convened. The Crittenden-Johnson resolutions of July
1861 denied that the government was
waging war “in any spirit of oppres-
sion, nor for any purpose of conquest
or subjugation, nor purpose of over-
throwing or interfering with the
rights or established institutions of
those States,” but only “to defend and
maintain the supremacy of the Con-
stitution and to preserve the Union.”
In other words, the resolutions prom-
ised to leave slavery untouched in the
seceding states.
Political Slavery over Chattel Slavery
It is true that northern blacks, abolitionists, and Rad-ical Republicans, from the first salvo, did seek a cru-
sade against slavery.The prospect of wartime abolition
seduced even Garrison and most of his militant fol-
lowers into abandoning disunion. Only a handful of 
slavery opponents remained true to their original 
principles. Among them was Boston freethinker
Lysander Spooner, an abolitionist so enthusiastic about
John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry that he had
earnestly proposed kidnapping the governor of Vir-
ginia to hold as hostage in exchange for Brown’s life.
But although never a pacifist, Spooner saw absolutely
no moral analogy between slaves violently rising up to
secure their liberty and the central government vio-
lently crushing aspirations for self-determination on
the part of white southerners. After the war he would
write that the North had fought for the principle that
“men may rightfully be compelled to submit to, and
support a government they do not want; and that
resistance, on their part, makes them criminals and trai-
tors.”“Political slavery” had taken the place of “chattel
slavery.”
Lincoln meanwhile was drifting toward the Radical
position. He publicly warned that he would take what-
ever action he thought necessary to win the war. “My
paramount object in this struggle,” the President
declared in his oft-quoted reply to Horace Greeley, “is
to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy
slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any
slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all
the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing
some and leaving others alone I
would also do that. What I do about
slavery, and the colored race, I do
because I believe it helps to save the
Union; and what I forbear, I forbear
because I do not believe it would help
save the Union.” Lincoln added, how-
ever, that “I have here stated my pur-
pose according to my view of official
duty; and I intend no modification of
my oft-expressed personal wish that all
men every where could be free.”
When the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation
appeared on September 22, 1862, it was framed as a war
measure. It still gave the seceding states until the end of
the year to cease their rebellion and retain their slaves.
The proclamation did not emancipate any of the slaves
in the four border states that had not seceded. Nor did
it emancipate any slaves in many of the sections of the
Confederacy that the Union armies had already recon-
quered, including all of Tennessee and large portions of
Virginia and Louisiana.This anomaly inspired a cynical
retort from Secretary of State Seward. “We show our
sympathy with slavery,” he stated the day after the final
proclamation was issued,“by emancipating slaves where
we cannot reach them, and holding them in bondage
where we can set them free.”
Of course, northerners came around by the war’s
end to demanding that slavery’s elimination be com-
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plete and permanent. A little more than two months
before General Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomat-
tox, two-thirds of Congress passed a new, proposed
thirteenth amendment abolishing slavery within the
United States forever. Emancipation was therefore a
consequence of the Civil War. But it was a consequence
unintended at the outset, and played no discernible role
in the northern refusal to let the lower South go in
peace.
Yankee Civil Religion
Although mainstream historians will find no majorsurprises in the above account, they nonetheless
seem oblivious to how instrumental in bringing on the
carnage was northern worship of the
Union as absolute deity.Why was pre-
serving the nation’s existing bound-
aries such a big deal? Although
historians have thoroughly researched
southern motives for secession, they
have not done as good a job with
northern motives. Nationalist bias ele-
vates perpetual union to an automatic
and unquestioned standard. Exactly
how and why northerners came to
embrace this standard has never been
satisfactorily answered. Yet somehow
the mystical identification of Union
with Liberty had evolved into such a
cornerstone of the Yankee civil reli-
gion that it was impervious to all reason.
Peaceful secession has become a fixture of the 
modern world. Even before America’s war over seces-
sion, Belgium in 1830 had consummated a separa-
tion from the Netherlands that was almost entirely
without bloodshed. Norway seceded from Denmark 
in 1905 and Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Since
then, we have witnessed, among others, the peaceful
separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and 
the peaceful breakup of the totalitarian Soviet Union
into more than a dozen independent nations, includ-
ing Russia. So we ought to be able to view Lincoln’s
justifications for the Civil War with a healthy dose of
skepticism.
When in the mid-1990s Quebec held a referendum
on whether to secede from Canada, the Canadian cen-
tral government disavowed the use of force to prevent
the province’s departure. This incident contains some
striking parallels to southern secession because the pop-
ulation of Canada at the time was about 30 million,
slightly less than the U.S. population in 1860. Quebec
had seven million inhabitants, making it smaller than
the Confederacy became (about nine million) after
Lincoln’s call for troops but larger than the Gulf Coast
Confederacy (about five million) at the time of Lin-
coln’s inauguration.
The southern states had no right to self-determina-
tion because of slavery, runs the retort. But black slavery
was practiced in every one of Britain’s
North American colonies, from New
Hampshire to Georgia, at the opening
of the War for Independence. More-
over,Virginia’s royal governor issued a
proclamation on November 7, 1775,
similar to Lincoln’s Emancipation
Proclamation, freeing any slave who
would bear arms against the rebel-
lious colonists. At least 18,000 freed
blacks accompanied British forces as
they evacuated Savannah, Charleston,
New York City, and other places at
the end of the earlier war. South Car-
olina, the only colony with a slave
majority when independence was
declared, lost as much as one-third of its black popula-
tion to flight or migration. In short, most arguments
marshaled to deny the legitimacy of southern inde-
pendence in 1861 apply with almost equal force against
American independence in 1776.
As an excuse for civil war, maintaining the State’s
territorial integrity is bankrupt and reprehensible. Yet
that is the only excuse that Lincoln and the Republican
Party put forward. Slavery, to repeat, neither explains
nor justifies northern suppression of secession. In the
final analysis we must accept the verdict of Moncure
Daniel Conway, another abolitionist, self-exiled from
his home in Virginia. The Union war effort, he sadly
concluded, reduces to “mere manslaughter.”
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